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Fiscal Magic: Outsourcing and the Taxing Power 
Some state and local governments in the United States are increasingly outsourcing services 
through third party surrogates. In some instances, outsourcing is used as a mechanism to raise 
revenue to cover current deficits or pay for goods that would otherwise require increasing taxes. 
We argue that certain forms of outsourcing have been used to mask accountability for the levying 
fees that are substantively indistinguishable from taxes and thus shift tax burdens. We call for 
additional research to examine the shifting cost burden associated outsourcing deals and the 
increased challenge of maintaining public fiscal accountability. 
  
Introduction 
Government authority to tax is directly related to the provision of public goods 
and services. The relationship between taxing authority and taxpayer is shaped by 
demands for goods and services and budget constraints. Principles like transparency, 
neutrality, equity and fairness have long been held essential to the proper exercise of the 
taxing power (Stiglitz 2000; Mikesell 2010). The recent legal argument that there is no 
“reasonable” distinction between a tax, a fee or a penalty, does not render the matter 
moot.1The imposition of a tax by a governmental unit possessing statutory taxing power 
is subject to certain constraints. The governmental unit that fails to comply with those 
constraints risks loss of legitimacy. 
The purpose of this paper is to examine one of the ways in which local 
government officials may relinquish taxing power. In this paper, it is argued that 
outsourcing pays for hidden costs using a powerful “fiscal illusion.” The fiscal illusion 
associated with outsourcing is so powerful it might be deemed “fiscal magic.” The fiscal 
magic to which is alluded in this paper evades transparency and therefore legitimacy. 
This paper first presents a brief explanation of the notion of fiscal illusion- a term that 
represents multiple hypotheses for how the costs of public goods and services are hidden 
and difficult to calculate. Then this notion is extended to show how tax arrangements not 
designed for, but used to, support outsourcing revenue collection can hide real costs from 
the public. Such hidden costs result in another sort of fiscal illusion. This notion is 
applied to a case study in Indianapolis, Indiana – a city that has vigorously embraced the 
outsourcing of goods and services historically provided by government, within a state 
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that has done likewise.  Finally, this paper concludes with some thoughts on the wider 
implications of these notions.  
 
Fiscal Magic and Fiscal Illusion 
Like good magicians, sometimes public officials are able to deflect the attention 
of their taxpayer audience from what is actually important in understanding how taxes 
pay for government goods and services. When public officials are able to pull this kind of 
trick, the public believes that some managerial magic has been performed on the costs 
and associated tax revenues rather than having them understand that the bargain price is 
an illusion.  Nevertheless, the reality is that a good illusion has passed for magic. This is 




When public officials’ implement shifts in the tax burden which are not 
transparent to the taxpayers and create the impression that the resulting tax burden is 
better than it is, they are using a fiscal illusion. Clearly, public officials may have an 
incentive to do this. Public officials may appear fiscally conservative while covertly 
addressing constituent demands at a perceived lower cost.  Fiscal illusion is a concept 
based upon the notion that taxpayers do not always understand the real costs at which 
they receive public goods and services. Oates (1988) specifically presents five potential 
forms of fiscal illusions used by public officials: (1) tax structure complexity; (2) income 
elasticity of tax structure; (3) renter illusion; (4) the Flypaper Effect; and (5) debt illusion. 
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He notes that Puviani (1903) and Buchanan (1967) suggest that political leaders may 
fragment tax levies through complex tax structures to make it difficult for taxpayers to 
accurately identify the actual costs associated with public goods and services. In addition, 
public officials may benefit from the hidden tax burden shift from landlords to renters, 
creating a renter illusion, which leads to increased spending when a jurisdiction is made 
up of a larger fraction of renters. Furthermore, public officials may offset taxes collected 
from highly income elastic sources when economic circumstances are beneficial for the 
underlying tax base (i.e., income elastic tax structure) or from intergovernmental 
revenues (i.e., flypaper effect). Finally, when taxpayers are confronted by borrowing 
strategies that displace the current costs of public services and goods onto future 
generations they may be denied the transparency necessary to calculate those costs as part 
of the tax burden and suffer from a particular fiscal illusion, what might be called debt 
deception and Vickery calls “debt illusion” (1961).  
Oates (1988) explains that the empirical evidence has yielded mixed results for 
various fiscal illusion hypotheses. Those hypotheses are difficult to test. Outcomes 
sought are whether or not circumstances exist that reduce the perceived costs of public 
goods and services.  
This paper suggests that fiscal illusion may occur through an additional 
mechanism, the outsourcing of the taxing power- a fiscal mechanism we provocatively 
refer to as fiscal magic because it encompasses and transcends typical fiscal illusionary 
strategies. This is an illusionary tactic that is easier to explain. It is a case in which the 
power to tax for providing public goods and services has been delegated to the 
nongovernmental sector. A case from Indianapolis, Indiana illustrates the fiscal transfer 
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associated with our hypothesis of fiscal magic in which public officials relinquish a 
portion of their taxing power to finance a particular project that is not disclosed as such. 
Specifically, the case looks at the sale of a public sewer and water utility to generate 
revenue for the repair of sidewalks and streets.   
 
Outsourcing as a Source of Fiscal Illusion  
 Outsourcing, privatization and contracting2are terms employed to describe 
mechanisms intended to provide government services through third-party surrogates. 
There are literally hundreds of scholarly articles on these and various other aspects of 
contracting and the New Public Management.  These terms have been subject to 
comprehensive analyses by scholars in public administration, political science, and law 
among others  (e.g. Dannin 2006, Minow 2000, Project on Government Oversight 2011, 
Milward 1994, 1995, 1996; Milward and Provan 1993, 1998, 2000, Brudney, Ryu, 
Wright 2003; Hefetz and Warner 2004, Winston, Burwick, McConnell and Roper 2002; 
Kennedy and Jensen 2004, Kennedy and Bielefeld 2002, Kennedy 2003,  Dannin 2008; 
Fernandez 2007; Marvel and Marvel 2007 Kennedy 2001, Metzger 2003, Gilmour and 
Jensen 1998).  
Yet little of this literature has focused on the relationship between outsourcing 
and taxation. Specifically, the current literature has not examined how the former affects 
the levying of the latter when delegating to vendors and other third parties the inherently 
governmental authority to raise fees or tax. There remains an unanswered question. Has 
outsourcing been used effectively to mask accountability for the levying of fees that are 
substantively indistinguishable from taxes and thus shift tax burdens? 
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 Creating Fiscal Illusion through Outsourcing Taxation: The Indianapolis Water 
Utilities PILOT 
The State of Indiana and especially the City of Indianapolis have been among the 
units of government most enthusiastic about outsourcing, and have entered into 
transactions that highlight the sort of question to which we allude. Indiana’s Toll Road 
contract to lease the Indiana Toll Road to a private consortium for 75 years drew 
criticism for a number of reasons, not the least of which was the ceding of authority to 
raise tolls to a private vendor; that contract was similar to infrastructure outsourcing 
elsewhere (Gilmour 2012).Had the Governor and legislature opted for a bond issue 
secured by higher toll revenues instead of leasing arrangement, the State’s yield may 
have been substantially higher. Such a decision would have required the legislature to 
raise tolls (these tolls fall within the definition of fees, rather than taxes); however, the 
lease transaction shifted the decision about raising tolls from legislators to the private 
vendors and made it a business rather than a political decision. This insulated elected 
legislators from the consequences of a potentially unpopular decision. Rates for use on a 
public property went up, but “the public” did not pay more and “public officials” did not 
decide to raise the rates – fiscal magic!  
 
Indianapolis Water and Sewer Utility Sale 
The subsequent sale of Indianapolis’ water and sewer utilities was a highly 
sophisticated transaction that raised far more complicated issues. The Indianapolis Water 
Company had operated as an investor-owned utility for most of its existence.   In 2002, 
during the Peterson Administration, the City of Indianapolis purchased the water 
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company, citing the need to control costs. A number of experts publicly charged that the 
City paid too much for the utility; whether or not those criticisms were justified, the City 
found itself facing significant deferred maintenance costs and a lack of employees with 
the expertise needed to oversee management of the utility. The Peterson administration 
also negotiated a settlement with the EPA of a protracted lawsuit over numerous 
environmental violations caused by an inadequate City-owned sanitary sewer system.  
After a new administration was installed, the City’s ability to assume the costs of 
the deferred maintenance of the water company and the legally-required upgrades to the 
sewer system were further challenged by newly-enacted property tax caps in 2008. Those 
caps reduce the amount of revenue the City can collect by limiting the property tax bill to 
one percent of the gross assessed value for homestead property, two percent of the gross 
assessed value for other residential and agricultural property, and three percent of gross 
assessed value for the remainder real and personal property. Effectively, the property tax 
caps amounted to savings for taxpayers and less revenue for local governments.  
 
Citizens Energy Group Purchase 
Faced with mounting costs and recognizing that the operation of utilities requires 
specialized skills not within the City’s core mission, the City decided to sell the water and 
sewer utilities to Citizens Energy Group (formerly, Citizens Gas and Coke 
Utility).Founded in 1887 as Consumers Gas Trust Company, Citizens was established as 
a public charitable trust, controlled by a self-perpetuating Board of Trustees who appoints 
the company’s directors. Citizens is widely regarded as a well-run utility management 
company, and the decision to vest control of all the city’s utilities in a public trust had 
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much to recommend it. Citizens not only had the management depth and expertise to 
administer the water and sewer systems, its unusual legal status of Charitable Public 
Trust removed many of the concerns that attend a transfer of public functions to a for-
profit third party.  
The structure of the transaction, however, raises a number of disquieting 
questions about transparency, the locus of the tax burden, and the funding of public 
services generally. The Mayor promoted the sale of the utilities by promising to use the 
proceeds for needed infrastructure repairs (i.e., streets and sidewalks). Two legal 
documents governed the transfer: an MOU, or Memorandum of Understanding, and the 
Contract of Sale. Stripped to the essentials, the agreement called for Citizens to pay for 
the acquisition of the water and sewer systems by assuming their combined existing 
liabilities, totaling nearly 3.5 billion dollars. However, a straightforward assumption of 
liabilities would not have resulted in an “up front” cash windfall that the City hoped to 
use to repair infrastructure and supplement dwindling tax revenues. 
 
Tax Increase Paid by Ratepayers Pays for Bond Issue 
Therefore, the money for the infrastructure repairs was generated through the 
modification of payment in lieu taxes (PILOT) amounts payable to the City by Citizens 
Energy as a not for profit entity.  Payments in lieu of taxes to municipalities for the 
foregone taxes on real estate or for changes in the taxable status of organizations are 
common in the U.S. As part of the transfer agreement, Citizens “voluntarily” recalculated 
the amount due annually to the City under the statute requiring a PILOT payment.  The 
City then issued bonds, secured by the increased PILOT, and used the proceeds of those 
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bonds to repave streets and repair other decaying infrastructure. The Mayor, running for 
re-election, could and did claim credit for completing very visible public improvements 
“without raising taxes.” 
The higher PILOT payments by Citizens, meanwhile, become part of the 
calculation of the utility’s rate base, which if increased will be passed on in rates to the 
utility’s clients. Under Indiana law, had Citizens simply “overpaid” for the water and 
sewer systems, the amount by which the purchase price exceeded the fair market value of 
the acquired assets would not have been an allowable basis for calculating the rate. 
PILOTS, however, are an allowable expense in the rate base. 
This highly sophisticated financing scheme for the sale raises both legal and 
policy issues. The PILOT statute provides that the appropriate maximum payment will be 
equivalent to the property tax that would be due on tangible property owned but for that 
property’s exempt status. The terms of the sale—a transfer in exchange for assumption of 
debt—confirmed that both parties assigned a negative value to the tangible property; 
what Citizens was purchasing was an intangible value --the ongoing income stream of 
rate payments. It is by no means clear that a PILOT payor can “voluntarily” raise its 
payment, although when that question was raised to a member of Citizens’ board, the 
authors were told that the board had obtained and relied upon a legal opinion that the 
strategy was permissible. 
Bifulco, Bunch, Duncombe, Robbins, and Simonsen (2012) recently addressed 
the distinction between selling government assets for the purpose of avoiding deficits (or 
raising additional revenue) and selling government assets that may have more value 
under private ownership. The problem associated with selling assets to cover current 
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deficits or as a revenue mechanism to cover current costs, is that it creates a fiscal illusion 
by masking the ongoing fiscal burden for which proceeds from the sale of the asset are 
being used. In the Indianapolis case, a not for profit organization financed the purchase of 
local government asset by taking on a tax debt with that same local government: the local 
government is issuing debt against the asset to pay for the purchase of the asset and its 
maintenance.  Eventually, the purchase price will have to be covered in the maintenance 
and operating costs. 
The upshot is that Citizens will need to raise its rates in order to pay both for 
necessary infrastructure improvements for the utility and the increased PILOT payments. 
Higher rates to cover the costs of infrastructure repair and maintenance would have been 
necessary in any event; that is, even if the City had retained control of the utilities, those 
costs would be fees borne by ratepayers 
The amount by which rates must be raised to cover the additional PILOT, 
however, is another matter. It shifts the cost of street and infrastructure repair from 
property taxpayers to utility ratepayers. As a result, the linkage between the tax cost and 
public benefit of street and sidewalk repair is severed: ratepayers pay the upfront bill for 
a public good enjoyed by all taxpayers and taxpayers only pay later, if the PILOT 
payments do not cover the debt to be retired.   
 
Conclusion 
To the extent that accountability requires transparency, efforts to pay for public 
infrastructure but avoid a “tax increase” will increasingly challenge fiscal accountability. 
Hidden, or insulated, expenditures will feed into unrealistic public expectations about the 
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costs of public services. Despite a rich literature dealing with other aspects of contracting 
and privatization, however, these sorts of transactions, and their implications for tax 
policy and public finance, have received inadequate attention. We do not know how 
widely these strategies are being used, how much control over revenues government 
agencies are ceding to private actors, the effects of the shifts in tax burden, or the long-
term consequences of today’s “let’s make a deal” approach to financing public goods. We 
need research to answer these and other questions raised by novel approaches to public 
finance and taxation. 
Because accountability requires transparency we need to work on increasing 
transparency in practice, too. Whether we call these charges taxes, fees, or penalties, and 
whether we call these increasingly complicated relationships privatization, public-private 
partnerships, contracts for services, or outsourcing, one thing is clear: the discretion in the 
contracting relationship should be open and transparent to inspection by both participants 
and the public. It is important to specify and make readily available the actual costs of tax 
levies or user changes, bond issues, bond funded projects, purchase agreements, and asset 
transfer among many other multi-sector transactions.  One thing that can be done is to 
require broader financial impact assessments and make these publically available before 
deals are made. Another is to ensure that better contracting measures are in place that 
force costs in the operation and financing of public enterprise to be made public. These 
sorts of arrangements have potential to change the face of public administration and 





1. The recent U.S. Supreme Court decision from the National Federation of Independent 
Business v. Sebelius, ruled the Affordable Care Act a proper exercise of Congressional 
authority under the taxing power. That decision highlighted not only the surprisingly 
contested question of what constitutes a tax, but equally contested and blurred 
distinctions between a “fee,” a “penalty” and a tax. 
2. It has been pointed out that “privatization,” properly understood, does not fall in this 
category. Privatization is the sale of government assets to the private sector. (Thatcher’s 
sale of steel mills to private interests in Great Britain, for example.) In the U.S., however, 
the term is used interchangeably with outsourcing and contracting to mean the practice of 
delegating public service delivery to third parties. 
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